Everything About Discussion Board

Telephone conversations between employers and their employees is a common way of sharing vital information between the two parties. In most cases, the employers may prefer that specific conversations involving their staff be recorded for quality and follow-up purposes. However, before recording such communications, it is proper that the employer informs the employee that the discussion will be recorded before actually recording it. Furthermore, this will not only enhance the employee’s confidence, but it will also relieve the employer of the accusations of having the conversation recorded without the due consent of the employee. A year ago I asked my friend (who is the best writer ever) to write my college essay for me and it was my first deal ever. Great feeling when you realize that you have made something successfully.

The federal law provides that an employer has no permission of recording telephone conversations they have with their workers unless under two main exceptions. The key exception is if the employee is in full knowledge of the recording prior to the conversation and thereby consents to it (Bain and Taylor 41). In this case, it is reasonable for the employers to notify those participating in telephone conversations that the call is or will be recorded for certain reasons. Another exception comes in if the phone call to undergo recording is duly intercepted by communication-related instrument which is fully equipped by the communication service provider within the regular course of business.

Finally, in consideration of increasing levels of technology and quicker spread of knowledge in this century, employers should never take it for granted that their respective employees are much more aware of their rights than before. Further, giving such critical information to the workers prior to the telephone conversation recording not only ensures that employees retain their respect, but also makes them more vigilant in the type of information they give during the conversation (Bain and Taylor 63). All in all, in order to build and maintain a good working relationship, recording a telephone conversation must only be done with the knowledge of the employee.


For instance, if I may think that John owns a Subaru because I see him driving it yet I don’t exactly know if he owns the Subaru that he drives or a different Subaru. Similarly, unknown to me, I may assume Kelvin to be owning a Subaru although I lack any reason to think that way because I have never seen him driving one or I have on several occasions seen him taking a train for most of the commutations. Supposing p is the statement, “Either John or Kelvin owns a Subaru.” I believe p is true. I have tangible reasons to believe p, and I have access to the grounds. Therefore, according to the simple theory, I know… However, I may want to say I know p because coincidence forms the basis for my belief.

Nozick’s explanations tend to avoid Gettier problems despite the fact that the need to solve those problems was the motivation behind the theory (Hetherington, 2010). Conditions (1) and (2) of the argument are true belief supplements with other two subjective conditions (3) and (4). We can combine the simple theory with that of Nozick to meet Kripke’s objection and the problems from Gettier. Seeking conclusive reasons can result to a skeptic situation. Consequently, we may be left without knowing anything. This theory, however, may also not work. It only succeeds in evading Gettier problems but fail to satisfy Kripke. Consider the example below:

George is waiting outside Mr. Humphrey’s office to talk to Mr. Humphrey. He sees Mr. Humphrey’s identical twin enter the room and he mistakes him for Mr. Humphrey because he is not aware that Mr. Humphrey has a twin brother. Mr. Humphrey’s secretary informs George that Mr. Humphrey is in the office-not after seeing his twin brother enter the office but because she is sure Mr. Humphrey is in the office and she has the tendency of reporting correctly whatever she knows about the whereabouts of Mr. Humphrey. Suppose George has fallen in love with Mr. Humphrey’s secretary as he is seeing her for the first time, he may probably believe whatever she tells him. He also doesn’t know that she happens to be highly trustworthy when reporting the whereabouts of Mr. Humphrey.

In the above example, conditions (1) and (4) are satisfied: Mr. Humphrey is in the office, and George believes Mr. Humphrey is the office. George has genuine reasons to believe the presence of Mr. Humphrey in his office; he saw someone identical to Mr. Humphrey enter Mr. Humphrey’s office. If Mr. Humphrey weren’t in the office, his secretary would definitely tell George that Mr. Humphrey wasn’t in the office, and George would believe Mr. Humphrey wasn’t in his office. If Mr. Humphrey wasn’t in the office in other comparable circumstances, then George would again feel Mr. Humphrey was in the office. Although this theory is an improvement on that of Nozick as it needs a knowledge bearer to have access to genuine reasons to believe in particular circumstances. The theory still gives an allowance for the reasons to be wrong ones. In George’s case, his reason is that he saw Mr. Humphrey enters the office-it was a wrong idea.


The paper has discussed Nozick’s theory of knowledge and the various assumptions on its view of knowledge. From the theory, different conditions are drawn to determine the truthfulness or the wrongness of a situation. Numerous illustrations have been used to elaborate the arguments of the theory from skeptic viewpoints. The essay has also proceeded to look at some of the objections to Nozick’s response to sceptical arguments. DeRose’s was the first objection, and it argues that rejecting the principle of closure is a form of counter-intuition. According to this objection, it seems fair to adopt contextualism when responding to scepticism. DeRose might be right that contextualism offers a plausible response, although contextualism has not has had an in-depth consideration in this paper. The second objection is more general than being specific as put forward by Kripke. Kripke’s objections have a force, and it is not easy to identify the solution that it suggests. The paper has discussed how two immature theories failed in providing reasonable answers. It is feasible to say that the types of contextualism can offer much better solutions although a deeper investigation into the matter is of great importance to ascertain the feasibility.


Does Nozick Offer A Satisfying Response To The Sceptic?

This paper elucidates the theory of knowledge by Robert Nozick and illustrates how the approach responds to scepticism. The essay revolves around an argument which suggests that Nozick’s response to a sceptic argument is not satisfying, thus objecting the theory in a general view.

Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge

According to the theory, S knows p if only; (1) p is true (2) S believes p (3) if p is not true, S would not believe p (4) if p is not right, S would believe p.  Whereas the first two conditions; (1) and (2) are forthright, the last two states need an explication (Forbes, 1984). The third condition doesn’t say that not-p involves not-(S believes p). Instead, it means in all possible worlds where not-p is right; they are very close to the reality, not-(S believes p) is similarly true. This condition is meant to a coarse elucidation of the third state. We require a metric on possible worlds’ space to make it definite. Similarly, the fourth condition does not say p involves (S believes p). Instead, it says that in all the possible worlds where p is true, and that is very close to the reality, (S believes p) is also right.

We notice that the third and fourth conditions are very much related to the condition which states that p causes S’s belief of p. There are several cases whereby the fact of p creating S’s belief of p implies that the third and fourth conditions are satisfied. In such cases, the account of Nozick agrees with the cause theory by Goldman regarding the knowledge ascriptions. Nozick does not give us a metric, and it is surprising as it turns out to be a formidable task. It is highly possible that Nozick has a metric in mind, but it’s not formulated. We only get a rough idea of what is going on in his mind by evaluating different examples. Nevertheless, the causal theory is nowhere close to the account of Nozick.  Some cases satisfy the causal condition but never meet conditions (3) and (4). There are also other cases which meet the two conditions but fail to satisfy the causal condition.

Nozick holds that his theory, which is also known as the conditional theory of knowledge, beats the following sceptical arguments. (1) I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat. (2) If a person was to know that p involves q and he was supposed to know p, then he would probably know q. (3) I know that by sitting down to write an essay involves the implication that I’m not a brain in a vat. Therefore, I don’t know I’m sitting down writing an article. The conditional theory of knowledge approves the first proposition.  Considering that I am aware that I am not a brain in a vat, the following conditions would hold; (i) It is true I’m not a brain in a vat (ii) I do believe I’m not a brain in a vat (iii) if I were a brain in a vat, I wouldn’t believe I am not a brain in a vat (iv) if I were a brain in a vat I would still believe I’m not a brain in a vat.

Condition (iii) doesn’t hold regardless of whether or I am not a brain in a vat in the real world and in all other possible worlds that considers me a brain in a vat, I still believe I am not. Because condition (iii) is not right, Nozick’s theory insists that I don’t know I am not a brain in a vat. Nozick’s theory agrees with the premise (iii), but on the other hand, it disagrees with the conclusion (Garrett, 1983). The sceptical argument does not only tend to indicate that I don’t know I am sitting down to write an essay. Instead, it purports to suggest that I almost don’t know anything. The sentence, ‘I’m sitting down to write an article’ can be replaced by any other sentence that describes an ordinary state of affair.

Nozick is in agreement with premises (iii) and (iv) of a sceptical argument and its concluding statement. Assuming that the case is authentic, then he has to reject premise (ii), and this is exactly what he does (Greco, Sosa and Zagzebski, 1998).  This second proposition is referred to as the closure principle as it holds that knowledge is closed in a logical implication. The conditional theory of knowledge is in disagreement with the closure principle due to the disclosure of conditions (3) and (4) in a logical implication. It might be true that (3)* if p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe p and (K) S knows p to entail q. However, these conditions aren’t enough to make sure that (3)* if q weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe q.

As an illustration; suppose p is a statement, “S was made in London, ” and q is another statement “S was made on Earth.” It is likely that (3) and (K) would be true while (3) would not be true. There is no single reason to substantiate the truth of (3) and (K) and adequate to clarify the closest worlds where S was not made on Earth. In this case, S doesn’t believe it was made on earth. Therefore, condition (3) of the truth’s conditional theory isn’t closed in a known logical meaning, and hence knowledge is not at all enclosed in a logical implication.

Objection from DeRose

Keith DeRose argues that it is counter-intuitive to reject the closure principle. He writes that accepting Nozick’s treatment entails embracing a detestable conjunction that although you may not know you are a bodiless and possibly handless, you will still know that you’ve got hands. Lightly, DeRose’s reply to a sceptical argument begins with a rejection of the argument’s first proposition. DeRose can be described as an epistemic contextualist.   Theories of contextualising epistemologies about the value of truth in the inscriptive knowledge are sensitive to particular facts about a speaker as well as hearers of a context. Furthermore, there are certain cases whereby it’s sincere to say S is aware he is isn’t a brain in a vat and he is actually ignoring the possibility of being a brain in a vat. In such contexts, premise (1) of the sceptical argument usually fails, and as a result, the conclusion of the argument doesn’t follow.

The contextualists and Nozick theories have worked pretty well, and they succeed to take out part of the force of a sceptic argument (Landesman, 1999). It is evident why we may argue that the theory by Nozick has a counter-intuitive attribute. It is counter-intuitive to find one speaker honestly saying that S knows p and at the same time another one in a context which is different from that of the first speaker, indeed saying that S does not know p. Such scenarios offer a flat analogy to demonstrate the meanings differently. It seems that one speaker could say “Q is flat” and at the same time another one in a different context say truly that “Q isn’t flat.” For instance, a driver driving on a particular road may find the way to be flat, but at the same time, a road maintenance worker who is looking for bumps would conclude that the road isn’t flat. Contextualists use such analogies to bring forth a persuasion of the way they view knowledge ascriptions without counter-intuition. Lewis (1996) states that ignoring does not mean we aren’t thinking in any way but instead it implies our awareness of the possibilities, but we rather put them aside.

There is another argument that objects Nozick’s theory. Some practices of externalism reject justification as a knowledge condition as claimed by Nozick. Such explanations provide a fascinating interpretation of what it’s for a belief to establish a track of truth or correct information without giving a knowledge account. The reason for this is that no one understands whether what he accepts is the truth when it would be as well reasonable for one take the opposite based on the available information. An indispensable normative condition for a person to know p is more sensible for one to accept p than denying p based on the available information that one can access. Such a case implicates the need for a condition which can justify a case.

The objection is an appeal to intuition. Nozick’s theory doesn’t require a knowledge bearer to discern justification for an actual belief. Kripke (2011) holds that such a case runs a counter-intuitive understanding of what it means to know something. Kripke’s argument has an intuitive appeal. However, there are some legitimate reasons for it to take the form that it has. The argument can apply to a contextualist theory, but it needs further investigation.  The open inadequacy of the theory lies in the Gettier problems it faces.